| First Anglo-Burmese War ပထမ အင်္ဂလိပ် မြန်မာ စစ် |
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The Storming of one of the principal stockades on its inside, near Rangoon, on the 8th of July 1824. |
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| Belligerents | |||||||||
| British East India Company | Kingdom of Burma | ||||||||
| Commanders and leaders | |||||||||
| Sir Archibald Campbell Joseph Wanton Morrison |
Maha Bandula † Maha Ne Myo † Minkyaw Zeya Thura |
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| Strength | |||||||||
| 50,000 | 40,000 | ||||||||
| Casualties and losses | |||||||||
| 15,000 | Unknown but much higher than the British | ||||||||
The First Anglo-Burmese War (Burmese: ပထမ အင်္ဂလိပ် မြန်မာ စစ်; [pətʰəma̰ ɪ́ɴɡəleiʔ mjəmà sɪʔ]; 5 March 1824 – 24 February 1826) was the first of three wars fought between the British and Burmese Empire in the 19th century. The war, which began primarily over the control of northeastern India, ended in a decisive British victory, giving the British total control of Assam, Manipur, Cachar and Jaintia as well as Arakan and Tenasserim. The Burmese were also forced to pay an indemnity of one million pounds sterling, and sign a commercial treaty.[1][2]
The war was the longest and most expensive war in British Indian history. Fifteen thousand European and Indian soldiers died, together with an unknown number of Burmese army and civilian casualties. The campaign cost the British five million pounds sterling to 13 million pounds sterling (roughly 18.5 billion to 48 billion in 2006 US dollars)[3] that led to a severe economic crisis in British India in 1833.[4]
For the Burmese, it was the beginning of the end of their independence. The Third Burmese Empire, for a brief moment the terror of British India, was crippled and no longer a threat to the eastern frontier of British India.[3] The Burmese would be crushed for years to come by repaying the large indemnity of one million pounds (then US$5 million), a large sum even in Europe of that time.[2] The British would make two more wars against a much more weakened Burma, and swallow up the entire country by 1885.
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By 1822, Burmese conquests of Manipur and Assam had brought a long border between British India and the kingdom of Ava. The British, based in Calcutta, had their own designs on the region, and actively supported rebellions in Manipur, Assam and Arakan. Calcutta unilaterally declared Cachar and Jaintia British protectorates, and sent in troops.[5] Cross border raids into these newly acquired territories from British territories and spheres of influence vexed the Burmese. Convinced that war was inevitable, Burmese commander in chief Bandula became a main proponent of offensive policy against the British. Bandula was part of the war party at Bagyidaw's court, which also included Queen Me Nu and her brother, the lord of Salin.[3] Bandula believed that a decisive victory could allow Ava to consolidate its gains in its new western empire in Arakan, Manipur, Assam, Cachar and Jaintia, as well as take over eastern Bengal.[5]
In January 1824, Burmese sent in one of his top lieutenants Thado Thiri Maha Uzana into Cachar and Jaintia to chase away the rebels. The British sent in their own force to meet the Burmese in Cachar, resulting in the first clashes between the two. The war formally broke out on 5 March 1824, following border clashes in Arakan.
The British reason for the war was in addition to expanding British Bengal's sphere of influence, the desire for new markets for British manufacturing.[6][7] The British were also anxious to deny the French the use of Burmese harbours and concerned about French influence at the Court of Ava, as the kingdom was still known to them.[8] Symes's mission was fully equipped to gain as much knowledge as possible of the country for future British plans whereas previous envoys were concerned principally with trade concessions. Anglo–French rivalry had already played a role during Alaungpaya's endeavours of unifying the kingdom.[8] The Burmese in these wars were advancing into smaller states not ruled by the British or the subject of expansionary goals by the British before the war began, and the British were not so much preoccupied by the refugee problem initially as by the threat posed by the French until further incidents forced their hand.[8]
The commander in chief of the Burmese army, Maha Bandula was supported by twelve of the country's best battalions, including one under his personal command, all totaling 10,000 men and 500 horses. His general staff included some of the country's most decorated soldiers, men like the lord of Salay and the governors of Danyawaddy, Wuntho and Taungoo. Bandula's plan was to attack the British on two fronts: Chittagong from Arakan in the southeast, and Sylhet from Cachar and Jaintia in the north.[5] Bandula personally commanded the Arakan theater while Uzana commanded Cachar and Jaintia theater.[3]
Early in the war, battle hardened Burmese forces were able to push back the British forces because the Burmese, who had been fighting in the jungles of Manipur and Assam for nearly a decade, were more familiar with the terrain which represented "a formidable obstacle to the march of a European force".[1] Uzana had already defeated the British units in Cachar and Jaintia in January 1824. In May, Burmese forces led by U Sa, Lord Myawaddy (about 4000)[9] fought their way into Bengal, and defeated British troops at the Battle of Ramu, 10 miles east of Cox's Bazaar on 17 May 1824.[10] Sa's column then joined Bandula's column on the march to defeat British forces at Gadawpalin, and went on to capture Cox's Bazaar.[11] The Burmese success caused extreme panic in Chittagong and in Calcutta.[12] Across the eastern Bengal, the European inhabitants formed themselves into militia forces. And large portion of the crews of East India Company's ships were landed to assist in the defense of Calcutta.[13]
But Bandula, not wanting to overstretch, stopped U Sa from proceeding to Chittagong. Had Bandula marched on to Chittagong, which unbeknown to him was lightly held, he could have taken it and the way to Calcutta would have been open.(The Burmese, because of the disparity in arms, could not have won the war in any case. But had they been able to threaten Calcutta, the Burmese could have obtained more favorable terms in the peace negotiations later on.)[2]
Instead of fighting in hard terrain, the British took the fight to the Burmese mainland. On 11 May 1824, a British naval force of over 10,000 men (5000 British soldiers and over 5000 Indian sepoys) entered the harbor of Yangon, taking the Burmese by surprise.[14][15] The Burmese pursuing a scotched earth policy, left an empty city, and instead chose to fortify positions along an east-west 10-mile arc outside the city. The British forces led by General Archibald Campbell took position inside a fortified Shwedagon Pagoda compound. The British launched attacks on Burmese lines, and by July 1824, had successfully pushed the Burmese towards Kamayut, five miles from Shwedagon. Burmese efforts to retake Shwedagon in September failed.[16]
King Bagyidaw ordered a near complete withdrawal from the western front—Bandula from Arakan and Bengal, and Uzana from Assam, Cachar and Jaintia—and meet the enemy in Yangon. In August, in the midst of monsoon season, Bandula and his army crossed the Arakan Yoma.[17] Even in good weather, moving tens of thousands of men over the 3000-foot-high Arakan hills or 10,000-foot-high Assamese ranges, heavily forested and with only narrow footpaths, open to attack by tigers and leopards, would be difficult. To do this at the height of the drenching monsoon season was a particularly difficult task. Yet Bandula (from Arakan) and Uzana (from Assam) in a testament to their generalship and logistical skill, managed to do just that. The king granted both Bandula and Uzana the title Agga Maha Thenapati, the highest possible military rank. Bandula was also made the governor of Sittaung.[16]
By November, Bandula commanded a force of 30,000 massed outside Yangon. Bandula believed that he could take on a well-armed British force of 10,000 head-on. Although the Burmese were numerically superior, only 15,000 of the 30,000 had muskets. The Burmese cannons fired only balls whereas the British cannons fired exploding shells.[14] Unbeknown to him, the British had just received the first shipment of the newest weapon in war that the Burmese had never seen–Congreve rockets.[17][18] More ominously for the Burmese, the speedily march through the hilly regions of Rakhine Yoma and Assamese ranges left their troops exhausted.
On 30 November, in what turned out be the biggest mistake of his career, Bandula ordered a frontal attack on British positions. The British with far superior weaponry, withstood several Burmese gallant charges at the Shwedagon fort, cutting down men by thousands. By 7 December, the British troops, supported by rocket fire, had begun to gain the upper hand. On 15 December, the Burmese were driven out of their last remaining stronghold at Kokine.[18] In the end, only 7000 of the 30000 Burmese soldiers returned.[14]
Bandula fell back to his rear base at Danubyu, a small town not far from Yangon, in the Irrawaddy delta. Having lost experienced men in Yangon, the Burmese forces now numbered about 10,000, of mixed quality, including some of the king's best soldiers but also many untrained and barely armed conscripts. The stockade itself stretched a mile along the riverbank, and was made up of solid teak beams no less than 15 feet high.[18]
In March 1825, a four thousand strong British force supported by a flotilla of gun boats attacked Danubyu. The first British attack failed, and Bandula attempted a counter charge, with foot soldiers, cavalry and 17 fighting elephants. But the elephants were stopped by rocket fire and the cavalry found it impossible to move against the sustained British artillery fire.[18]
On 1 April, the British launched a major attack, pounding down on the town with their heavy guns and raining their rockets on every part of the Burmese line. Bandula was killed by a mortar shell. Bandula had walked around the fort to boost the morale of his men, in his full insignia under a glittering golden umbrella, discarding the warnings of his generals that he would prove an easy target for the enemy's guns. After Bandula's death, the Burmese evacuated Danubyu.[18]
U Sa was left to command remaining Burmese troops in Arakan after Bandula and the main battalions were ordered to withdraw from Arakan by Bagyidaw to meet the British invasion in Yangon in August 1824. Sa held on to Arakan throughout 1824 when the main focal point of the war played out in Yangon. After Gen. Archibald Campbell finally defeated Gen. Bandula in the Battle of Yangon in December 1824, the British turned their sights to Arakan. On 1 February 1825, an invasion force of 11,000 soldiers supported by a flotilla of gun boats and armed cruisers along the coast and a squadron of cavalry under the command of Gen. Morrison attacked Burmese positions in Arakan. Despite their superior numbers and firearms, the British had to fight depleted Burmese forces for nearly two months before they reached to the main Burmese garrison at Mrauk-U, Arakan's capital. On 29 March 1825, the British launched their attack on Mrauk-U. (At the same time, Campbell also launched an attack on Bandula's positions in the Battle of Danubyu.) After a few days of fighting, the Burmese at Mrauk-U were defeated on April 1, coincidentally the same day Maha Bandula fell at Danubyu. Sa and remaining Burmese forces evacuated and left Arakan. The British proceeded to occupy the rest of Arakan.[9]
On 17 September 1825, an armistice was concluded for one month. In the course of the summer, General Joseph Wanton Morrison had conquered the province of Arakan; in the north, the Burmese were expelled from Assam; and the British had made some progress in Cachar, though their advance was finally impeded by the thick forests and jungle.
Peace negotiations that began in September broke down by early October after the Burmese would not agree to British terms. The British had demanded no less than the complete dismemberment of the Burmese western territories in Arakan, Assam, Manipur and the Tenasserim coast as well as two million pounds sterling of indemnity. The Burmese would not agree to give up Arakan and the large sum of indemnity.[19]
In November 1825, the Burmese decided to throw everything they had in a one last ditch effort. Starting in mid-November, the Burmese forces, consisted mainly of Shan regiments led by their sawbwas, threatened Prome in a daring circular movement that almost surrounded the town and cut off communications lines to Yangon. In the end, the superior firepower of the British guns and missiles won out.[19] On 1 December, Gen. Campbell, with 2500 European and 1500 Indian sepoys, supported by a flotilla of gun boats, attacked the main Burmese position outside Prome. On 2 December, Maha Ne Myo was killed by a shell launched from the flotilla. After Maha Ne Myo's death, the British dislodged the Burmese by 5 December.[20]
The defeat in Prome effectively left the Burmese army in disarray. The Burmese army was in constant retreat from then on. By February 1826, the Burmese were forced to accept the British terms to end the war. On 26 December, they sent a flag of truce to the British camp. Negotiations having commenced, peace was proposed to them on the following conditions.
The British demanded and the Burmese agreed to:[1][2]
The first installment of indemnity was to be paid immediately, the second installment within the first 100 days from signing of the treaty, and the rest within two years. Until the second installment was paid, the British would not leave Yangon.[2]
The Treaty of Yandabo was signed by Gen. Campbell from the British side and Governor of Legaing Maha Min Hla Kyaw Htin from the Burmese side on 24 February 1826.[21] The Burmese paid 250,000 pounds sterling in gold and silver bullion as the first installment of the indemnity, and also released British prisoners of war. The war was thus brought to an end, and the British army moved south. The British army remained in the territories surrendered to it under the treaty and in the territories such as the Rangoon area which were occupied for several years in guarantee of the financial terms of the treaty.
The treaty imposed a severe financial burden to the Burmese kingdom, and effectively left it crippled. The British terms in the negotiations were strongly influenced by the heavy cost in lives and money which the war had entailed. Some 40,000 British and Indians troops had been involved of whom 15,000 had been killed. The cost to the British India's finances had been almost ruinous, amounting to approximately 13 million pounds sterling. The cost of war contributed to a severe economic crisis in India, which by 1833 had bankrupted the Bengal agency houses and cost the British East India Company its remaining privileges, including the monopoly of trade to China.[4]
For the Burmese, the treaty was a total humiliation and a long lasting financial burden. A whole generation of men had been wiped out in battle. The world the Burmese knew, of conquest and martial pride, built on the back of impressive military success of the previous 75 years, had come crashing down.[22] The Court of Ava could not come to terms with the loss of the territories, and made unsuccessful attempts to get them back. An uninvited British Resident in Ava was a daily reminder of the humiliating defeat.[4]
More importantly, the burden of indemnity would leave the royal treasury bankrupt for years. The indemnity of one million pounds sterling would have been considered a colossal sum even in Europe of that time, and it became frightening when translated to Burmese kyat equivalent of 10 million. The cost of living of the average villager in Upper Burma in 1826 was one kyat per month.[2]
The treaty achieved its objective: Leave Burma crippled. Indeed, the British would make two more wars—much easier wars—against the much weaker Burmese in 1852 and 1885, and swallow up the entire country by 1885.
This article incorporates text from a publication now in the public domain: Chisholm, Hugh, ed (1911). Encyclopædia Britannica (11th ed.). Cambridge University Press.